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Some possible (re)sources of indeterminism and randomness encountered in physics are enumerated. These
gaps in the physical laws, if they exist, could possibly be exploited for dualistic interfaces. We also speculate
that physical laws and order could possibly emerge from primordial chaos by means resembling statistics and
Ramsey theory.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Occasionally physics is confronted with the following is-
sue: although there is no apparent law determining the behav-
ior of certain physical systems, these physical systems evolve
nevertheless. This gives rise to speculations that there are (ir-
reducible) gaps in the (known) laws of physics, which in turn
motivate claims of indeterminism or even total randomness in
nature.
Presently the consensus among quantum physicists and
philosophers of science appears to be this: as long as one
considers a (pure quantum) state (of knowledge) of individual
particles subsumed under the name quanta, or average proper-
ties (of “large” groups) of quanta, the universe appears lawful.
Alas the details of the occurrence of individual events related
to such quanta cannot be causally explained and predicted. In
particular, the details of the behavior of individual quanta –
such as the exact time of their creation, scattering and annihi-
lation – are believed to be irreducibly unpredictable and ran-
dom. Thus quantum indeterminism is postulated to be ontic,
as opposed to the epistemic, means relative, way of perceiving
unpredictability in classical (statistical) physics [1].
For the sake of an example, suppose we are dealing with
an atom in an excited state which eventually is bound to de-
cay, thereby emitting a photon; that is, a quantum of light:
while the half-life (which is a probabilistic quantity) of the
excited state can be determined with arbitrary precision, the
exact time of the individual spontaneous decay remains un-
predictable to this day.
Already in 1926, Born [2, p. 302] subsumed this situation
as follows: “the motion of particles conforms to the laws of
probability, but the probability itself is propagated in accor-
dance with the law of causality. [This means that knowledge
of a state in all points in a given time determines the distribu-
tion of the state at all later times.]” In that same year Born
stated that [3, p. 54] “I myself am inclined to give up deter-
minism in the world of atoms.”
This presents a challenge for physics, philosophy, as well as
religion. Because how should one cope with questions such
as indeterminacy and the apparent violation of the principle
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of sufficient reason? What kind of deity and mind is consis-
tent with Born’s inclinations? And why does the universe ap-
pear lawful if it is essentially made up of randomly occurring
events?
In what follows we shall be dealing with some aspects and
alternative answers to these questions. We shall first present
some nomenclature, followed by subjective motivation to pur-
sue metaphysical questions of existence pertinent to the top-
ics discussed, and present a very brief historic account on
physical unknowables [4]. Later on we shall evaluate var-
ious sources of physical indeterminism which could poten-
tially serve as gaps in a universe which otherwise appears law-
ful.
We also shortly dive into Ramsey theory which assures us
that any sufficiently large structure inevitably contains ordely
substructures which can be conjectured to be “lawful” – just
as the Elders looked up into the skies and “found” animal con-
stellations there [5]. Note also that [6, Theorem 6.1, p. 148],
“almost all real numbers, when expressed in any base, con-
tain every possible digit or possible string of digits” – even
entire deterministic universes.
A caveat: when it comes to physical (in)determinism one
should be aware of what Jaynes called the “Mind Projection
Fallacy” [7, 8]: “we are all under an ego-driven temptation
to project our private thoughts out onto the real world, by
supposing that the creations of one’s own imagination are real
properties of Nature, or that one’s own ignorance signifies
some kind of indecision on the part of Nature.
A second caveat: with regard to determinism versus inde-
terminism, there will never be any formal or empirical cer-
tainty one way or another besides the assurances of the ortho-
doxy. Because for embedded observers (as well as for “strong
enough” formal systems supporting universal computation –
in what follows the Term “computability” stands for Turing
computability [9, 10]) the general prediction and rule infer-
ence (induction) problems are provable unsolvable [11].
A. Nomenclature
What do we mean by unpredictable, (irreducibly) indeter-
ministic, or even random physical behavior [12]? Although
heuristically evident this is by no means trivial, because, for
the sake of boggling the mind, suppose that time is a contin-
2uum. Suppose further that a single physical event (such as the
emission of a photon) can happen at any time. Then with prob-
ability one it will not happen at any computable time. This is
due to the fact that, “almost all such times should be random.”
(Formally: since the set of computable numbers is countable,
the Lebesgue measure of computable reals on the unit interval
is zero.)
In what follows we mean by predictable that there is a
computable function, in particular one with computable rate
of convergence, which, given an arbitrary precision, yields a
prediction. That is, the resources required for making predic-
tions with better and better accuracies could be enormous as
long as they remain finite and computable. (This is, for in-
stance, not true for a Chaitin Omega number [13]: although it
is computably enumerable – that is, the limit of a computable,
increasing, converging sequence of rationales – it is random
and, in particular, unpredictable because it lacks a computable
rate of convergence.)
Since theological nomenclature hardly belongs to the stan-
dard repertoire of physicists but will be used later, some ter-
mini technici will be mentioned upfront. Thereby we will
mainly follow Philipp Frank’s (informal) definitions of gaps
and miracles [14, 15], as well as Robert Russell’s notions al-
lowing him to formulate the doctrine of non-interventionist
objective divine action (NIODA) [16, Part II,Chapter 4].
In the theological context, creatio ex nihilo often refers to
the ‘initial boot up of the universe;’ whereas creatio continua
stands for the permanent intervention of the divine throughout
past, present, and future. Alas, as we will be mainly inter-
ested with physical events, we shall refer to creatio ex nihilo,
or just ex nihilo, as something coming from nothing; in partic-
ular, from no intrinsic [17] causation (and thus rather consider
the theological creatio continua; apologies for this potential
confusion). Ex nihilo denies, and is in contradiction, to the
principle of sufficient reason, stating that nothing is without
intrinsic causation, and vice versa.
According to Frank [14, 15, Sect. II, 12], a gap stands for
the incompleteness of the laws of nature, which allow for the
occurrence of events without any unique natural (immanent,
intrinsic) cause, and for the possible intervention of higher
powers [14, 15, Sect. II, 9]: “Under certain circumstances
they do not say what definitely has to happen but allow for
several possibilities; which of these possibilities comes about
depends on that higher power which therefore can intervene
without violating laws of nature.”
This is different from a direct breach or ‘rapture’ of the laws
of nature [14, 15, Sect. II, 10]; also referred to as ontological
gap by a forced intervention in the otherwise uniformly causal
connection of events [16, Sect. 3.C.3, Type II]. An example
for an ontological gap would be the sudden ad hoc turn of a
celestial object which would otherwise have proceeded along
a trajectory governed by the laws of inertia and gravitation.
Often, the resulting correlations are subjectively and se-
mantically experienced as synchronicity, that is, with a pur-
pose – the events are not causally connected but “stand to one
another in a meaningful relationship of simultaneity” [18, 19].
A more personal example is Jung’s experience of a solid oak
table suddenly split right across, soon followed by a strong
steel knife breaking in pieces for no apparent reason [20, 21,
pp. 111-2, 104-5].
In what follows we shall adopt Frank’s conceptualization
of a miracle [14, 15, Sect. II, 15] as a gap (in Frank’s sense
cited above) which is exploited according to a plan or purpose;
so a ‘higher power’ interacts via the incompleteness (lack of
determinacy) of the laws of nature to pursue an intention.
Note that this notion of miracle is different from the com-
mon acceptation quoted by Voltaire, according to which
a miracle is the violation of divine and eternal laws [22,
Sect. 330]. Russel refers to the latter as ‘miracle in the
Humean sense’ [16, Sect. 3.C.7 ]: “a miracle is an event
which violates the laws of nature and which contradicts sci-
ence.”
An oracle is an agent capable of a decision or an emanation
(such as a random number) which cannot be produced by a
universal computer. Again, we take up Frank’s conception
of a gap, or of Russel’s NIODA, to conceptualize physical
oracles.
Finally, in what follows the term transcendence refers to
an entity or agent beyond all physical laws. (It is not used
in the Kantian sense.) In contrast, immanence refers to all
operational, intrinsic physical means available to embedded
observers [17, 23] from within some universe.
B. The mind-boggling fact of existence
Our first and foremost existential problem appears to be that
of existence [24]: why is there something rather than nothing?
In particular, why does the universe exist? What are we here
for? What is our origin and our destiny? (I would therefore
disagree with Camus [25] that the only serious philosophi-
cal problem is whether to commit suicide.) It might not be
too speculative to suggest that the resulting mind-boggling
amazement is the root of both religion and science, which
share a single goal, and thus might be seen as two sides of
the same endeavor: the pursuit of truth – how ephemeral this
may appear.
Reactions to existence can turn into feelings of terror, anx-
iety, panic or dread; a pavor nocturnus (night terror) in full
waking life. These are mostly stipulated by the suspicion that
there are no grounds on which to anchor possible answers; the
issue of existence rises before us like an barrier insurmount-
able for rational thought. Indeed, contemplation on existence,
if pursuit honestly and consequentially, may result in madness
and total destructive dissolution of the self; without any hope
of return to normality or redemption.
Various strategies have been developed to cope with the in-
dividual human experience of existence. We may group these
strategies into three branches: (i) religion, (ii) philosophy (e.g.
existentialism, materialism), and (iii) science. As all human
endeavors, these three branches share a common ground: all
of them are narratives.
Religion is a very powerful narrative, and it is a very big
grace to be able to believe. Because all of a sudden, when
viewed with belief, the Universe becomes light and bright,
and full of deep meaning.
3Natural sciences is a less gratifying narrative, but the result-
ing recommendations may have, on the average, more practi-
cal usefulness. Alas, as philosophers of science (e.g. Lakatos,
Popper & Feyerabend) clearly have stated, there is no absolute
truth in “scientific understanding.” Even mathematics, such as
Ramsey theory, cannot help, because it itself is a formalism.
Many so-called ‘philosophical’ approaches such as atheism
and materialism appear to be mere ideologies in disguise. (An
exception is a Camus-type existentialism.) Indeed, these ide-
ologies may become utterly dangerous in times of political
revolution and unrest (cf. Robspierre, Lenin, Stalin, to name
but a few leaders) – because they need not refer to any type of
immutable soul, and no ultimate responsibility.
Also logical ‘proofs’ of the existence of God, from Anselm
of Canterbury onwards to Go¨del and beyond [26] are based on
assumption which make them means relative with respect to
these assumptions and the type of logic used.
What can we learn from this? I suggest to keep in mind that
all narratives – as useful as they may appear in tool-building
and technology – represent no absolute truth but are of pre-
liminary nature, and are subject to constant changes, as time
passes by and history shows. Presently physics claims that
the world consists almost entirely of a vacuum void which
fluctuates by creating and annihilating all kinds of quanta –
the quanta themselves are point particles with no spatial ex-
tension at all; some of them mediate various forces, some
of them carry various charges and capacities to interact. Ac-
cording to this understanding, a ‘solid’ table is a very special
emptiness containing these quanta. Gravity has been trans-
lated into the geometry of space-time. Many observations in
deep space appear unexplained; the metaphorical hypothesis
for these puzzling phenomena being dark matter (of unknown,
probably yet undiscovered, type), which appears to be invis-
ible, yet makes up most of the universe. These fragmentary
hypotheses and conjectures are hardly a solid basis for a sci-
entific ontology; less a complete, temporally stable body of
knowledge!
In coping with Jaynes’ “Mind Projection Fallacy” [7, 8] I
would personally recommend to adapt a contemplative strat-
egy of evenly-suspended attention outlined by Freud [27]. It
is a manner in which the individual should listen to the uni-
verse; without any too strong (mostly unconscious) emotional
bias. (For instance, fear creates tendencies to accept the op-
posite: fear of determinism yields longing for indeterminism,
and vice versa [28].) We need to be open for new approaches,
scenarios and phenomena; as well as of being aware, in the
spirit of Socrates, of the vastness of the domains of physical
existence we know very little about. Augustinus’ dictum “Ei
mihi, qui nescio saltem quid nesciam!” (Alas for me, that I
do not at least know the extent of my own ignorance!) guides
us more than ever.
So, by having this in mind, we are finally in the position
to cautiously, and, with hopefully evenly-suspended attention,
engage questions regarding a ‘room for divinity’ in the sci-
ences, or, conversely, a ‘room for science’ in religion.
C. A rise of indeterminism
Almost unnoticed at first, the tide of indeterminism started
to build toward the end of the nineteenth century [29, 30].
At that time, the prevalent mechanistic theories faced an in-
creasing number of anomalies: to name but a few, there was
Poincare´’s discovery of instabilities of trajectories of celes-
tial bodies (which made them extremely sensible to initial
conditions), radioactivity [31, 32], X-rays, specific heats of
gases and solids, emission and absorption of light, in partic-
ular, blackbody radiation, and the irreversibility dilemma of
statistical physics based on reversible mechanics and electro-
dynamics.
Fin de sie´cle 1900 followed a short period of revolutionary
new physics, in particular, quantum theory and relativity the-
ory, without any strong metaphysical preference toward either
determinism or indeterminism. Then indeterminism erupted
boldly with Born’s claim that quantum mechanics has it both
ways: the quantum state evolves strictly deterministically,
whereas the individual event or measurement outcome occurs
indeterministically. Born made it clear that he was[33, p. 866]
“inclined to give up determinism in the world of atoms;” that
there is no cause for certain individual quantum events; that
is, such outcomes occur irreducibly at random.
Another indeterministic feature of quantum mechanics is
complementarity: there exist collections of observables (such
as position and momentum) which cannot be simultaneously
operationalized (i.e. prepared and measured) with arbitrary
precision. Still another indeterministic quantum feature is the
value indefiniteness of at least all but one complementary ob-
servables [34, 35].
There followed a fierce controversy, with many researchers
such as Born, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Pauli taking the in-
deterministic stance, whereas others, like Planck [36], Ein-
stein [37, 38], Schro¨dinger, and De Brogli, leaning toward
determinism. This latter position was pointedly put forward
by Einstein’s dictum in a letter to Born, dated December 12,
1926 [39, 113]: “In any case I am convinced that he [the Old
One] does not throw dice.”
At present, indeterminism is preached by the orthodoxy
to the extend that it is declared “the message of the quan-
tum” [40]. Although such claims are provable unprovable,
they are often motivated by the success of the quantum pos-
tulates, as well as from formal theorems about predictions
of general deterministic theories (relative to some supposedly
reasonable assumptions such as omniexistence and contextu-
ality [41] as well as locality) – such as Bell’s theorem [42] and
the Kochen-Specker theorem [34, 35, 43, 44].
The last quarter of the twentieth century saw the rise of yet
another form of physical indeterminism – or, rather, unpre-
dictability – originating in Maxwell’s and Poincare´’s afore-
mentioned discovery of instabilities of the motion of classical
bodies against variations of initial conditions [45–47].
In parallel, Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems [48–52], as
well as related findings in the computer sciences [6, 53–55],
put an end to Hilbert’s program of finding a finite axiom sys-
tem for all of mathematics. Go¨del’s incompleteness theorems
also established formal bounds on provability, predictability,
4and induction. (The incompleteness theorems also put an end
to philosophical contentions expressed by [56, 101] that, be-
yond epistemic unknowables and the “essential incompetence
of human knowledge,” there is “not a single real question for
which it would be logically impossible to find a solution.”)
Alas, just like determinism, physical indeterminism cannot
be proved, nor can there be given any reasonable criterion for
its falsification. After all, how can one check against all laws
and find none applicable? Unless one is willing to denote any
system whose laws are currently unknown or whose behavior
is hard to predict with present techniques as indeterministic,
there is no scientific substance to such absolute claims, espe-
cially if one takes into account the bounds imposed by the the-
ory of computability [9, 10]. So both positions – determinism
as well as indeterminism – must be considered conjectural.
II. OPTIONS IN VIEW OF SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS
Like Odysseus trapped between Scylla and Charybdis, our
physical worldview, as well as providence and free will, ap-
pears to be severely restricted by physical determinism as well
as complete indeterminism. Does a clockwork universe, as
well as one pushing uncontrollable chance, leave any room
for any freedom of the individual, or for divine interaction?
A. Determinism
Determinism blocks free will by the principle of sufficient
reason. Determinism might be beautiful and “rich” in the
sense of allowing ornamentation, but it lacks any kind of steer-
ing mechanism, or freedom of choice.
Formally, one of the most extreme forms of determinism is
expressed by the unitary quantum mechanical state evolution,
amounting to mere permutations, that is, one-to-one transi-
tions, among states and orthonormal bases [57].
B. Emergence of structure from primordial chaos
Creatio continua, that is, the ex nihilo occurrence of events
without any cause, leaves no room for choice either: because
if events happen ex nihilo and uncontrollably, there is no free-
dom of choice between alternatives either.
Let us, for the sake of exposing an extreme position, con-
template on an infinite universe without any law. That is, its
behavior cannot be “compressed” by any algorithm or rule.
One model of such a universe would be random real. We as-
sume that the algorithmic incompressibility of encoded micro-
physical structures might be a quite appropriate formalization
of primordial chaos. Indeed, while in monotheistic religions
usually the natural laws are considered to be created by god,
in Greek mythology and cosmology, χάος, that is, primordial
chaos, has been identified with a deity itself.
How could we, in more formal terms, imagine the appar-
ent lawfulness of the universe; despite or “above” primordial
chaos; and emerging from it? Maybe Ramsey theory could
give us a clue – because, from a combinatorial point of view,
no matter how irregular some behavior or pattern may be ap-
pear, the emergence of “law and order” is inescapable. Indeed,
once one is dealing with something (rather than nothing [24]),
and no matter how hard one tries to somehow “construct” or
create a sequence without correlations, such correlations are
unavoidable [5].
So maybe what we call ‘causality’ is just correlations? In
this line of speculation the natural laws could eventually be
derivable from Ramsey theory.
As an example, for the sake of emerging orderly logical
structures, let us generalize Landman and Robertson’s infor-
mal characterization of Ramsey theory [58, p. 1] and suppose
that Ramsey theory is the structure of properties under set par-
titions. One of the questions that immediately come up is par-
tition logics with its models in automaton logic [59] as well as
generalized urn models [60, 61], and the connections to quan-
tum mechanics [62–64].
C. Dualistic interfaces as path through Scylla and Charybdis
Suppose that transcendent agents, interact with a(n)
(in)deterministic universe via suitable interfaces. In what fol-
lows we shall refer to the transcendental universe as the be-
yond.
For the sake of metaphorical models, take Eccles’ mind-
brain model [65], or consider a virtual reality, and, more par-
ticular, a computer game. In such a gaming universe, var-
ious human players are represented by avatars. There, the
universe is identified with the game world created by an algo-
rithm (essentially, some computer program), and the transcen-
dental agent is identified with the human gamer. The interface
consists of any kind of device and method connecting a hu-
man gamer with the avatar. Like the god Janus in the Roman
mythology, an interface possesses two faces or handles: one
into the universe, and a second one into the beyond.
Human players constantly input or inject choices through
the interface, and vice versa. In this hierarchical, dualistic
scenario, such choices need not solely (or even entirely) be
determined by any conditions of the game world: human play-
ers are transcendental with respect to the context of the game
world, and are subject to their own universe they live in (in-
cluding the interface). Alas the game world itself is totally de-
terministic in a very specific way: it allows the player’s input
from beyond; but other than that it is created by a computation.
One may think of a player as a specific sort of indeterminis-
tic (with respect to intrinsic means) oracle, or subprogram, or
functional library.
Another algorithmic metaphor is an operating system, or a
real-time computer system, serving as context. (This is differ-
ent from a classical Turing machine, whose emphasis is not on
interaction with some user-agent. The user is identified with
the agent. Any user not embedded within the context is thus
transcendent with respect to this computation context. In all
these cases the real-time computer system acts deterministi-
cally on any input received from the agent. It observes and
obeys commands of the agent handed over to it via some in-
5terface. An interface could be anything allowing communica-
tion between the real-time computer system and the (human)
agent; say a touch screen, a typewriter(/display), or any brain-
computer interface.
III. HOW TO ACKNOWLEDGE INTENTIONALITY?
The mere existence of gaps in the causal fabric are no suffi-
cient condition for the existence of providence or free will,
because these gaps may be completely supplied by creatio
continua,
As has already been observed by Frank [14, Kapitel III,
Sects. 14, 15], in order for any miracle or free will to mani-
fest itself through any such gap in the natural laws, it needs
to be systematic, according to a plan and intentional (German
planma¨ßig). Because if there were no possibilities to inject
information or other matter or content into the universe from
beyond, there would be no possibility to manipulate the uni-
verse, and therefore no substantial choice.
Alas, intentionality may turn out to be difficult or even im-
possible to prove. How can one intrinsically decide between
chance on the one hand, and providence, or some agent exe-
cuting free will through the gap interface, on the other hand?
The interface must in both cases employ gaps in the intrinsic
laws of the universe, thereby allowing steering and communi-
cating with it in a feasible, consistent manner. That excludes
any kind of immanent predictability of the signals emanating
from it. (Otherwise, the behavior across the interface would
be predictable and deterministic.) Hence, for an embedded
observer [23] employing intrinsic means which are opera-
tionally available in his universe [17], no definite criterion can
exist to either prove or falsify claims regarding mere chance
(by creatio continua) versus the free choice of an agent. Both
cases – free will of some agent as well as complete chance –
express themselves by irreducible intrinsic indeterminism.
For the sake of an example, suppose for a moment that we
would possess a sort of ‘Ark of the Covenant,’ an oracle which
communicates to us the will of the beyond, and, in particular,
of divinity. How could we be sure of that? (Sarfatti, in or-
der to investigate the paranormal, attempted to built what he
called an Eccles telegraph by connecting a radioactive source
to a typewriter.) This situation is not dissimilar to problems in
recognizing hypercomputation, that is, computational capaci-
ties beyond universal computation [66].
IV. PHYSICAL GAPS
If we translate the algorithmic metaphors mentioned ear-
lier into the context of our own universe, we have to ob-
serve whether all the respective components are physically
feasible. In particular, we might ask the following questions:
(i) Do there exist potential gap-type interfaces in our uni-
verse allowing communication with some (supposedly tran-
scendental) agent? (ii) Are there constraints on such interven-
tions [4, 67, 68]? We may also speculate about the transcen-
dental nature of any agent communicating with our universe
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Figure 1. (Color online) A gap created by a black particle sitting on
top of a potential well. The two final states are indicated by grey
circles. Their positions can be coded by 0 and 1, respectively.
via such interface.
The first question, in particular, the existence of suitable
gaps in the natural laws and the causal fabric of the universe,
has been investigated by Frank [14, 15, Chapter III, Sec. 12],
as well as by more recent research [16]. Several physical gap
constructions will be critically reviewed next.
A. Deterministic chaos and spontaneous symmetry breaking
Already in 1873, Maxwell identified a certain kind of in-
stability at singular points as rendering a gap in the natural
laws [45, 211-212]: “. . . when an infinitely small variation
in the present state may bring about a finite difference in the
state of the system in a finite time, the condition of the system
is said to be unstable. It is manifest that the existence of un-
stable conditions renders impossible the prediction of future
events, if our knowledge of the present state is only approxi-
mate, and not accurate.”
Fig. 1 (see also Frank’s figure 1 in Chapter III, Section 13)
depicts a one dimensional gap configuration envisioned by
Maxwell: a “rock loosed by frost and balanced on a singular
point of the mountain-side, the little spark which kindles the
great forest, . . .” On top, the rock is in perfect balanced sym-
metry. A small perturbation or fluctuation causes this symme-
try to be broken, thereby pushing the rock either to the left or
to the right hand side of the potential divide. This dichotomic
alternative can be coded by 0 and by 1, respectively.
One may object to this scenario of spontaneous symmetry
breaking by maintaining that, if indeed the symmetry is per-
fect, there is no movement, and the particle or rock stays on
top of the tip (potential). Any slightest movement might ei-
ther result from a microscopic asymmetry or imbalance of the
particle, or from fluctuations of any form, either in the parti-
cle’s position due top quantum zero point fluctuations, or by
the surrounding environment of the particle. For instance, any
collision of gas molecules with the rock may push the latter
over the edge by thermal fluctuations.
Moreover, deterministic chaos is not indeterministic at all:
the randomness resides in the assumption of the continuum
from which the initial value is ‘drawn’ (just like an urn). In
this case, almost all (of Lebesgue measure one) initial val-
ues are not representable by any algorithmically compress-
ible number; that is, they are random [6, 69]. Determinis-
tic chaos unfolds the information contained therein by a re-
cursively enumerable (computable), deterministic evolution
function. If the continuum assumption is dropped, then what
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Figure 2. (Color online) A gap created by a quantum coin toss. A sin-
gle quantum (symbolized by a black circle from a source (left crossed
circle) impinges on a semi-transparent mirror (dashed line), where it
is reflected and transmitted with a 50:50 chance. The two final states
are indicated by grey circles. The exit ports of the mirror can be
coded by 0 and 1, respectively.
remains is Maxwell’s and Poincare´’s observation of the epis-
temic unpredictability of the behavior of a deterministic sys-
tem due to instabilities and diverging evolutions from almost
identical initial state.
B. Quantum oracles
A quantum mechanical gap can be realized by a half-
silvered mirror [70–72], with a 50:50 chance of transmission
and reflection, as depicted in Fig. 2. A gap certified by quan-
tum value indefiniteness necessarily has to operate with more
than two exclusive outcomes [35]. Ref. [73] presents such a
qtrit configuration.
One may object to the orthodox view [40] of quantum in-
determinism by pointing out that it is merely based on a belief
without proof. It is not at all clear where exactly the random-
ness generated by a half-silvered mirror resides; that is, where
the stochasticity comes from, and what are its origin. (Of-
ten vacuum fluctuations originating from the second, empty,
input port are mentioned, but, pointedly stated [74, p. 249],
these “mysterious vacuum fluctuations . . . may be regarded as
sugar coating for the bitter pill of quantum theory.”)
More generally, any irreversible measurement process, and,
in particular, any associated ‘collapse,’ or, by another denomi-
nation, ‘reduction’ of the quantum state (or the wave function)
to the post-measurement state is a postulate which appears to
be means relative in the following sense.
The beam splitter setup is not irreversible at all because a
50:50 mirror has a quantum mechanical representation as a
permutation of the state, such as a unitary Hadamard transfor-
mation; that is, with regard to the quantum state evolution the
beam splitter acts totally deterministic; it can be represented
by a one-to-one function, a permutation. (Experimentally, this
can be demonstrated by serially concatenating two such 50:50
mirrors so that the output ports of the first mirror are the in-
put ports of the second mirror. The result (modulo an overall
phase) is a Mach-Zehnder interferometer reconstructing the
original quantum state.)
Formally – that is, within quantum theory proper, aug-
mented by the prevalent orthodox ‘Kopenhagen-type’ inter-
pretation – it is not too difficult to locate the origin of ran-
domness at the beam splitter configuration: it is (i) the pos-
sibility that a quantum state can be in a coherent superposi-
tion of classically distinct and mutually exclusive (outcome or
scattering) states of a single quantum; and (ii) the possibility
that an irreversible measurement ad hoc and ex nihilo stochas-
tically ‘chooses’ or ‘selects’ one of these classically mutually
exclusive properties, associated with a measurement outcome.
This, according to the orthodox interpretation of quantum me-
chanics, is an irreducible indeterministic many-to-one process
– it transforms the coherent superposition of a multitude of
(classically distinct) properties into a single, classical prop-
erty. This latter assumption (ii) is sometimes referred to as the
reduction postulate.
Already Schro¨dinger has expressed his dissatisfaction with
both assumptions (i) and (ii), and, in particular, with the quan-
tum mechanical concept of ontological existence of coherent
superposition, in various forms at various stages of his life: he
polemicized against (i) by quoting the burlesque situation of
a cat which is supposed to be in a coherent superposition be-
tween death and life [75]. He also noted the curious fact that,
as a consequence of (i) and in the absence of measurement
and state reduction (ii), according to quantum mechanics we
all (as well as the physical universe in general), would become
quantum jelly [76].
Alas, what in the orthodox scriptures of quantum mechan-
ics often is referred to as ‘irreversible measurement’ remains
conceptually unclear, and is inconsistent with other parts of
quantum theory. Indeed, it is not even clear that, ontologi-
cally, an irreversible measurement exists! Wigner [77] and, in
particular, Everett [78, 79] put forward ontologic arguments
against irreversible measurements by extending the cut be-
tween a quantum object and the classical measurement ap-
paratus to include both object as well as the measurement ap-
paratus in a uniform quantum description. As this latter situ-
ation is described by a permutation (i.e. by a unitary transfor-
mation), irreversibility, and what constitutes ‘measurement’
is lost. Indeed, the reduction postulate (ii) and the uniform
unitarity of the quantum evolution cannot both be true, be-
cause the former essentially yields a many-to-one mapping of
states, whereas uniform unitarity merely amounts to a one-to-
one mapping, that is, a permutation, of states. In no way can
a many-to-one mapping ‘emerge’ from any sort of concatena-
tion of one-to-one mappings! Stated differently, according to
the reduction postulate (ii), information is lost; whereas, ac-
cording to the unitary state evolution, no information is ever
lost. So, either one of these postulates must be ontologically
wrong (they may be epistemically justified for all practical
purposes [80], though). In view of this situation, I am (to use
Born’s dictum [33, p. 866]) inclined to give up the reduction
postulate disrupting permutativity, and, in particular, unitar-
ity, in the world of single quantum phenomena, in favor of
the latter; that is, in favor of permutativity, and, in particular,
unitarity.
The effort to do so may be high, as detailed beam recom-
bination analysis of a Stern-Gerlach device (the spin ana-
logue of a beam splitter in the Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ter) shows [81, 82]. Nonetheless, experiments (and propos-
als) to “undo” quantum measurements abound [83–91]. Thus
7we could say that for all practical purposes [92], that is, rel-
ative to the physical means [1] available to resolve the huge
number of degrees of freedom involving a macroscopic mea-
surement apparatus, measurements appear to be irreversible,
but a close enough look reveals that they are not. So, irre-
versibility of quantum measurements appears to be epistemic
and means relative, subjective and conventional; but not ontic.
(As already argued by Maxwell, this is just the same for the
second law of thermodynamics [1].)
C. Vacuum fluctuations
As stated by Milonni [93, p. xiii] and others [94, 95],
“. . . there is no vacuum in the ordinary sense of tranquil noth-
ingness. There is instead a fluctuating quantum vacuum.” One
of the observable vacuum effects is the spontaneous emission
of radiation [96]: “. . . the process of spontaneous emission
of radiation is one in which “particles” are actually created.
Before the event, it consists of an excited atom, whereas after
the event, it consists of an atom in a state of lower energy, plus
a photon.”
Recent experiments achieve single photon production by
spontaneous emission [97–101], for instance by electrolumi-
nescence. Indeed, most of the visible light emitted by the sun
or other sources of blackbody radiation, including incandes-
cent bulbs, is due to spontaneous emission [93, p. 78].
Just as in the beam splitter case discussed earlier the quan-
tum (field theoretic) formalism can be used to compute (scat-
tering) probabilities – that is, expectations for occurrences of
individual events, or mean frequencies for large groups of
quanta – but remains silent for single outcomes.
Alas, also in the quantum field theoretic case, unitarity, and
thus permutations, govern the state evolution. Thus, for sim-
ilar reasons mentioned earlier – mainly the uniformity of the
validity of unitary quantum evolutions – the ontological status
of indeterminism remains uncertain.
If we follow the quantum canon, any such emission is an ir-
reducible, genuine instance of creation coming from nothing
(ex nihilo); more precisely, in theological terms, the sponta-
neous emission of light and other particles amounts to an in-
stance of creatio continua. (This is also true for the stimulated
emission of a quantum.)
A gap based on vacuum fluctuations is schematically de-
picted in Fig. 3. It consists of an atom in an excited state,
which transits into a state of lower energy, thereby produc-
ing a photon. The photon (non-)creation can be coded by the
symbols 0 and 1, respectively.
It might not be too unreasonable to speculate that all
gap scenarios, including spontaneous symmetry breaking and
quantum oracles, are ultimately based on vacuum fluctuations.
V. INTERPRETATIONS OF QUANTUM THEORY
When it comes to giving meaning to the quantum formal-
ism, the majority view seems to be that there is none; at least
❄
❘
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Figure 3. (Color online) A gap created by the spontaneous creation
of a photon.
none that can be developed rationally: consider the “no in-
terpretation interpretation” of quantum mechanics suggested
by Fuchs and Peres [102], or Feynman’s fierce warning [103,
p. 129] not to “get ‘down the drain,’ into a blind alley from
which nobody has yet escaped.”
We suggest that any such statement is nothing but a stop
sign, or at least a benign recommendation, erected by frus-
trated peers suspecting that everybody else will be as unsuc-
cessful as they have been to figure out how to proceed beyond
quantum theory.
At the same time – and somehow in accord with the no-
interpretation interpretation – the majority also seems to be-
lieve in various variants of Bohr’s “Copenhagen interpreta-
tion,” which comes conveniently because Bohr has both been
seemingly deep yet not very concrete – for the sake of an ex-
ample take Bohr’s observation [104] regarding “the impossi-
bility of any sharp separation between the behavior of atomic
objects and the interaction with the measuring instruments
which serve to define the conditions under which the phenom-
ena appear.”
Alas Bohr (as so many times before) had it wrong; at
least when referring to “classical measurements:” because
quantum evolution, which is essentially about permutation of
states, is inconsistent with any irreducible irreversible mea-
surement. The postulate of any “fundamental cut” between
observer and object is, strictly – but not for all practical pur-
poses (FAPP) [92] – speaking, purely conventional [105], and
contradicts the unitary quantum evolution. So either quantum
theory is universally valid and the Copenhagen interpretation
(at least any one claiming that irreversible measurements ex-
ist) is wrong, or the other way round. (I am inclined to favor
quantum theory over the Copenhagen interpretation.)
With regard to Everett’s many-world interpretation [79] the
situation is not dissimilar to Bohr’s informal approach: while
fully recognizing the deficiency of any absolute cut between
observer and object [78], Everett is not very specific about
branching; and, in particular, suffers from the impossibility
to explain any other than a 50:50 branching ratio at measure-
ments without additional assumptions.
There also exist a huge number of necessarily nonlo-
cal [37], contextual [106] “hidden variable theories” which,
FAPP, cannot be experimentally falsified, and thus cannot
present more in their favor than quantum theory; alas for the
overhead of additional “hidden” parameters [107]. (So why
bother? Maybe because someday there will be one with a
phenomenology beyond quantum theory.)
Thus, having ruled out, or at least discredited, most so-
8called “interpretations” of the quantum formalism, at least
to this author, the most natural and compact interpretation
of the quantum formalism seems to be that a pure quantum
state – in the form of a context (that is, a maximal set of
co-measurable observables), and an overlaid two-value frame
function [108] – is a complete formal representation of a quan-
tized system [41]. Through quantum evolution pure states are
permuted. If there is a discrepancy between a state prepared
and a property measured; that is, if there is a mismatch be-
tween preparation and measurement, context translation [109]
introduces epistemic stochasticity due to the huge number of
classical degrees of freedom of the measurement apparatus.
VI. REPROGRAMMING THE UNIVERSE
So far, all that physics has attempted is preparing physical
states and devices capable to manipulate such states in certain
ways so that, by causality, a desirable physical state evolution
follows. In algorithmic terms, this is like feeding the appro-
priate input into some pre-defined computer, and processing
this input by a pre-defined algorithm to obtain some desired
output. Pointedly stated, so far physics has employed merely
a pocket calculator, initially provided – through creatio ex ni-
hilo – by divinity.
A next step would be to change the laws of nature them-
selves; that is, in algorithmic language, by reprogramming the
universe. I suggest to call this type of manipulation ontologic
magic (in contrast to the epistemic magic performed by pro-
fessional magicians), or just magic. Of course, magic requires
the universe to be programmable; and the natural laws to be
mutable. This, I speculate, might achieve an explanation for
the Resurrection of Jesus in modern terms, which, as has been
pointed out by Russel, should not be related to NIODA [16,
Sect. 3.C.7].
VII. SUMMARY
We have presented a brief historical account of indetermin-
ism and randomness in physics, followed by a discussion of
the origin and physical sources of physical random number
generators and the associated gaps in the laws of physics.
We have also discussed some philosophical and theologi-
cal ramifications of creatio continua; that is, the creation of
randomness ex nihilo in physics. Ex nihilo bits and pieces
contradict the principle of sufficient reason. They also imply
gaps in the lawful performance of physical systems.
We have also proposed a (dualistic) “steering” mechanism,
by which an external agent could interact through such gaps
in the physical laws within an otherwise lawful universe.
In greater detail, the present situation in physics is this: on
the one hand, virtually all – and there is not a single excep-
tion from this rule – individual events such as the creation, the
scattering, or the annihilation of a quantum (particle), occur
spontaneously, ex nihilo, and indeterministically. That means
that the details of such events cannot be predicted with ar-
bitrary accuracy by any physical law. This indeterminism is
postulated to be irreducible; that is, it is believed to be ontic
rather than epistemic.
On the other hand, if one considers groups of individual
events or quanta (particles), or the maximal (that is, pure
quantum) state of knowledge thereof, then the laws of micro-
physics appear strictly Laplacian deterministically. There is
no room for chance or randomness in the quantum state evo-
lution: every previous state is a permutation (indeed, a uni-
tary transformation) from a previous state into a future state.
Stated differently, if quantum mechanics is universally valid,
then every – and, again, there is not a single exception from
this rule – such evolution is strictly one-to-one, and onto.
How it is possible to consolidate the quantum (state) reduc-
tion (in the context of quantum wave functions also collapse)
postulate as a model for (irreversible) measurements in an en-
vironment which is uniformly governed by pertutations – that
is, unitary evolution – of the quantum state, remains unknown.
Indeed, the maintenance of both the uniform, universal unitary
state evolution on the one hand, as well as the reduction pos-
tulate during irreversible measurements on the other hand, is
inconsistent [41].
When it comes to actually locating gaps in the laws of
physics, we have discussed three scenarios: (i) instability of
some deterministic evolution due to an extreme sensitivity
against variation of initial values (nowadays often subsumed
under the term deterministic chaos); (ii) quantum beam split-
ters and state reduction; (iii) quantum vacuum fluctuations.
In the first scenario one could locate the gap at the assump-
tion that the initial value is a random real; and that it belongs
to a mathematical continuum. Whether or not this is a viable
formalization remains questionable, in particular, because so
far no capacity of the continuum – such as hyper-Turing com-
putability – has manifested itself as a physical capacity. The
Church-Turing thesis holds as strong as ever.
The second scenario also gives rise to various issues. For
instance, it is unclear exactly where the generation, or rather
emergence, of this type of randomness is located. Is it at
the beam splitter? Ideal quantum beam splitters are modeled
by Hadamard matrices (up to unitary equivalence), which are
unitary and thus perfectly reversible. Or is it at the detec-
tor after the beam splitter? Or is it ultimately at Wigner’s
friend [77]?
Actually, I do not believe that such a gap exists ontolog-
ically; the randomness we allegedly observe is means rela-
tive to our capacities to resolve the huge number of degrees
of freedom of a “macroscopic” measurement apparatus; and
hence these gaps in the laws of physics, as well as physical
indeterminism, are epistemic.
The third, field theoretic, scenario also remains problem-
atic, as quantum field theory is just a quantum theory of many
particles; and so inherits many issues within quantum theory.
In any case, in general it is impossible to either empirically
or formally prove or disprove any claims or hypothesis related
to physical determinism or indeterminism; on the contrary:
by reduction to the halting problem (or, equivalently, to Gdel
type incompleteness) it is provable that any claim of either
determinism or indeterminism is not provable. The best one
could say is that such claims are means relative: with respect
9to our current capacities we are inclined to believe in such-
and-such. Therefore, any absolute statement favoring deter-
minism or indeterminism remains conjectural, means relative,
context-dependent, as well as preliminary. But that is true for
all human scientific knowledge.
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